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Abstract
Recently automated deduction tools have proved to be very effective for detecting attacks on cryptographic protocols.
These analysis can be improved, for ﬁnding more subtle weaknesses, by a more accurate modelling of operators employed
by protocols. Several works have shown how to handle a single algebraic operator (associated with a ﬁxed intruder theory)
or how to combine several operators satisfying disjoint theories. However several interesting equational theories, such as
exponentiation with an abelian group law for exponents remain out of the scope of these techniques. This has motivated us
to introduce a new notion of hierarchical combination for non-disjoint intruder theories and to show decidability results for
the deduction problem in these theories. We have also shown that under natural hypotheses hierarchical intruder constraints
can be decided. This result applies to an exponentiation theory that appears to be more general than the one considered
before.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Recently many procedures have been proposed to determine whether cryptographic protocols are insecure
in the Dolev–Yao model with respect to a ﬁnite number of protocol sessions [5,2,32,26,23,4,17]. Among the
different approaches the symbolic ones [5,2,32,26,12,4,17] are based on reducing the problem to constraint
solving in a term algebra. While these approaches rely on a perfect encryption hypothesis, the design of some
protocols (see e.g. [35]) rely on lower-level primitives such as exponentiation or bitwise exclusive or (xor). These
speciﬁcations may give rise to new attacks exploiting the underlying algebraic structure when it is not abstracted
as perfect encryption. For examples of attacks exploiting e.g. the bitwise xor equational properties in the context
of mobile communications see for instance [6].
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Hence several protocol decision procedures have been designed for handling equational properties [30,15,
8,24] of the cryptographic primitives. A very fruitful concept in this area is the notion of locality introduced
by McAllester [25] which applies to several intruder theories [16,24]. When an intruder theory is local then we
can restrict every intruder deduction to contain only subterms of its inputs, i.e. its hypotheses and its goal and
this may lead to decidability of intruder constraints. In this article, we extend this approach to a case where
the signature can be divided into two disjoint sets and where the term algebra can be divided into two kinds of
terms, say kinds 0 and 1, according to their root symbol. Then we give sufﬁcient conditions so that we can restrict
intruder deductions to deductions where all subterms of kind 1 that occur in the deduction are subterms of the
inputs (i.e. some initially given terms and the goal term). Our goal is to bound the deductions using a “function”
of kind 1 by the intruder, thus permitting subsequent analysis to focus on the deductions by “function” of kind 0.
This approach allows us to decide interesting intruder theories presented as non-disjoint combination of
theories, and that were not considered before, by reducing them to simpler theories. For instance it allows one
to combine the abelian group theory of [27] with a theory of an exponential operator.
1.1. Related works
In [10] we have extended the combination algorithm for solving E-uniﬁcation problems of [34,3] to solve
intruder constraints on disjoint signatures. Here, we show that we can handle some non-disjoint combinations.
In [18] Delaune and Jacquemard consider theories presented by rewrite systems where the right-hand side of
every rule is a ground term or a variable. Comon and Treinen [16,14] have also investigated general conditions
on theories for deciding insecurity with passive intruders. In [1] different equational theories are considered for
passive intruders only.
As an application, we have obtained a decidable intruder theory combining abelian group and exponential
which has less restrictions than any previous one: unlike [9] it permits the intruder to multiply terms outside
exponents, which is natural with the Difﬁe–Hellman protocol where the prime decomposition of the module
is public. The setting is also less restrictive than in [33] where bases of exponentials have to be constants and
exponential terms must not appear inside exponents.
1.2. Outline
In Section 2 we present the topic of analysis of cryptographic protocol insecurity. In Section 3 we will ﬁrst
recall basic notions about terms, substitutions and term rewriting. In Section 4we recall the deﬁnition of intruder
systems from [10], we recall a model for cryptographic protocols and we deﬁne related constraint systems. In
Section 5 we deﬁne a new notion of mode. We then derive a notion of subterm value from the mode, and study
properties of term replacement operations. In Section 6 we deﬁne the notion of well-moded intruders. We also
prove the existence of special sequences of deductions called quasi well-formed derivations. In Section 7 we deﬁne
for a constraint system C a special kind of substitutions called bound substitutions. We prove that whenever a
constraint system C is satisﬁable it is also satisﬁed by a bound substitution. We also prove that these solutions
do not increase the number of subterms of C, i.e. after instantiating C with a bound solution, the number of
subterms in the result is lesser or equal. We then give in Section 8 sufﬁcient conditions for the decidability
of some protocol-related decision problems. We then apply these conditions to prove the decidability of the
protocol insecurity problem when an exponential operator is present.
2. Analysis of cryptographic protocols
2.1. An example
The Station-to-Station (STS) protocol (see e.g. [31]) is a cryptographic key agreement scheme that relies on
Difﬁe–Hellman key construction method. It improves over Difﬁe–Hellman protocol by adding signatures to
messages to block some simple man-in-the middle attacks. Hence STS protocol is classiﬁed as an authenticated
key agreement with key conﬁrmation protocol. Here is a simpliﬁed version of STS: initially g is a generator of a
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cyclic group p , and these parameters are public; A(lice) generates a random number a and computes and sends
the exponential exp(g, a) to B(ob); Bob generates a random number b and computes the exponential exp(g, b);
Bob concatenates the exponentials, signs them using his private key K−1B , appends it to exp(g, b) and sends the
resulting message to Alice. Alice veriﬁes Bob’s signature, concatenates the exponentials in reverse order, signs
them using her private key K−1A , and sends the result to Bob.
1. A → B : exp(g, a),A
2. B → A : exp(g, b), {exp(g, b), exp(g, a)}
K−1B
3. A → B : {exp(g, a), exp(g, b)}
K−1A
The ability for Alice and Bob to build a secret shared key exp(g, a× b) relies on the algebraic properties of
exp and ×: for instance it exploits the property exp(exp(g, a), b) = exp(exp(g, b), a) = exp(g, a× b). Moreover
it also relies on the properties of asymmetric cryptography that can modelled at an abstract level by laws of
type: {{m}
K−1A
}KA = m expressing that when applying KA (to be more precise, an algorithm depending from KA)
to the signed message {m}
K−1A
one can retrieve m.
This example shows that the design and the analysis of cryptographic protocols is often based on algebraic
properties of the functions involved in the messages. Moreover it is frequent that a property is expressed by
combining several operators, as it is the case above where some useful properties involve both exp and ×.
2.2. Analysis in presence of algebraic properties
As we see the algebraic properties of primitives are important for many protocols to work properly. As
a consequence they have to be handled appropriately when analysing the security of protocols. There exist
two main settings for performing protocol analysis: the computational one and the Dolev–Yao one. In the
computational setting one tries to reduce the security of protocols to the security of primitives (e.g. encryption),
which is itself characterised by the fact that no adversary can efﬁciently recover any information about the
encrypted message content, given the ciphertext and (in the case of a public key system) the encryption key.
This approach when successful provides strong security guarantees. However it leads to complex proofs and is
not easily amenable to automation. On the other hand the Dolev–Yao approach, sometimes called the symbolic
approach, rather considers encryption and other functions as abstract datatypes and allows formore automation
of security proofs.
Note that it is not worth attempting a computational security proof of a protocol if some ﬂaws are already
found in theDolev–Yaomodel. Hence the two approaches can be viewed as complementary: to secure a protocol
one may ﬁrst check for ﬂaws in the symbolic setting (possibly with automatic tools) and then, once they are
corrected, try computational proofs.
However in order to get a more faithful analysis in the symbolic setting one has to model as much as possible
the algebraic properties of the functions. A particularly important primitive is the modular exponentiation
function, whose properties are seldom handled by veriﬁcation tools. As mentioned above a challenge is also to
consider the properties of several functions together. In important instance of this problem is the case of an
exponentiation and an abelian group operator.
To model them we can use the following equational theory Eexp,×:
x × (y × z) = (x × y)× z (A)
x × y = y × x (C)
x × 1 = x (U)
x × i(x) = 1 (I)
exp(x, 1) = x (E0)
exp(exp(x, y), z) = exp(x, y × z) (E1)
In our approach to be detailed in the following the intruder abilities will be speciﬁed by a set of terms, such
as T = {x × y , i(x), 1, exp(x, y)}, representing the messages he can derive. For instance given x, y the intruder is
able to construct x × y . The difﬁculty when checking whether an intruder can derive a given message (e.g. in
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order to mount an attack) comes from the fact that we have to reason modulo an equational theory, and for
instance we have to consider that exp(exp(g, a), b) and exp(exp(g, b), a) represents the same message.
In [10] we have shown that it was possible to perform amodular protocol analysis when the equational theory
can be split in subtheories with disjoint functional signatures. Note however this approach does not allow in the
example above to separate the analysis on exp and × because of the equation (E1).
Hence our ﬁrst objective in this paper is to propose a method to reduce protocol analysis problems involving
equational theories to simpler ones. The second objective is to apply the method to decide insecurity in the
symbolic approach for protocols that use both exp and × with properties speciﬁed by E . In that case the
problem will be reduced to the decision of insecurity for protocols where only × occurs.
3. Terms and rewriting
3.1. Basic notions
We consider an inﬁnite set of free constants C and an inﬁnite set of variables X . For all signatures G (i.e. sets
of function symbols not in C with arities), we denote by T(G) (respectively, T(G,X )) the set of terms over G ∪ C
(respectively, G ∪ C ∪ X ). The former is called the set of ground terms over G, while the latter is simply called
the set of terms over G. The arity of a function symbol f is denoted by ar(f). Variables are denoted by x, y ,
terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and ﬁnite sets of terms are written E, F , ..., and decorations thereof, respectively.
We abbreviate E ∪ F by E, F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E\{t} by E\t.
Given a signature G, a constant is either a free constant or a function symbol of arity 0 in G. We deﬁne the
set of atoms A to be the union of X and the set of constants. Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of
variables occurring in t and by Cons(t) the set of constants occurring in t. We denote by Atoms(t) the set Var(t)
∪ Cons(t). A substitution  is an involutive mapping from X to T(G,X ) such that Supp() = {x|(x) = x}, the
support of , is a ﬁnite set. The application of a substitution  to a term t (respectively, a set of terms E) is denoted
t (respectively, E) and is equal to the term t (respectively, E) where all variables x have been replaced by the
term (x). A substitution  is ground with respect to G if the image of Supp() is included in T(G). A uniﬁcation
problem is a pair of terms denoted by s ?= t. A uniﬁcation system is a ﬁnite set of uniﬁcation problems. A solution
of a uniﬁcation system is a substitution , called a uniﬁer, such that for all pairs s ?= t in the system we have
s = t.
An equational presentation H = (G,A) is deﬁned by a set A of equations u = v with u, v ∈ T(G,X ) and u, v
without free constants. For any equational presentation H the relation =H denotes the equational theory
generated by (G,A) on T(G,X ), that is the smallest congruence containing all instances of axioms of A. Abusively
we shall not distinguish between an equational presentation H over a signature G and a set A of equations
presenting it and we denote both by H. We will also often refer to H as an equational theory (meaning the
equational theory presented by H).
The syntactic subterms of a term t are denoted Subsyn(t) and are deﬁned recursively as follows. If t is a variable
or a constant then Subsyn(t) = {t}. If t = f(t1, . . . , tn) then Subsyn(t) = {t} ∪⋃ni=1 Subsyn(ti). The positions in a
term t are sequences of integers deﬁned recursively as follows,  being the empty sequence. The term t is at
position  in t. We also say that  is the root position. We write p  q to denote that the position p is a preﬁx of
position q. If u is a syntactic subterm of t at position p and if u = f(u1, . . . , un) then ui is at position p · i in t for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We write t|p the subterm of t at position p . We denote by t[p ← s] the term obtained by replacing
in t the syntactic subterm at position p by s. If is a set of incomparable positions (with respect to the ordering
on positions) in term t we denote by t[ ← v] the term obtained by putting v at all positions of t that are in.
We write t[s] to denote a term t where s is a syntactic subterm of t.
In this paper, we will consider two disjoint signatures F0 and F1, an equational theory E0 (respectively, E1)
on F0 (respectively, F0 ∪ F1). We denote by F the union of the signatures F0 and F1 and by E the union of the
theories E0 and E1. We assume that E is consistent (i.e. two free constants are not equal modulo E). A term t
in T(F0,X ) (respectively,T(F1,X )) is called a pure 0-term (respectively, pure 1-term). We denote by top(·) the
function that associates to each term t its root symbol. We also partition the set of variables X into two inﬁnite
sets X0 and X1.
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3.2. Congruences and ordered rewriting
In this subsection, we recall some properties of ordered rewriting [19] which has been a useful notion (e.g. [3])
for proving the correctness of combination of uniﬁcation algorithms. Rewriting is the process of applying an
oriented equation l → r to reduce a term t, by replacing an instance of its left-hand side l by a corresponding
instance of its right-hand side r. Knuth–Bendix completionmethod [19] attempts to transforma set of equations
E into a set of oriented equations (or rewrite rules) R such that rewriting becomes a decision procedure for
deciding the word problem in E. However, the completion method may fail due to the impossibility of orienting
an equation. To avoid failure Knuth–Bendix completion procedure can be extended to deal with unorientable
equations obtaining the so-called unfailing completion procedure [22,19].
Let < be a simpliﬁcation ordering on T(G)2 assumed to be total on T(G) and such that the minimum for <
is a constant cmin ∈ C and non-free constants are smaller than any non-constant ground term.
Ordered rewriting is an extension of rewriting to unorientable equations: it is the process of applying an
equation u = v (or v = u) to reduce a term t, by replacing an instance of some side say u, by a corresponding
instance of the other side v under the condition that u > v.
Given a signature G, we denote by CspeG the set containing the constants in G and cmin. For the signatureF = F0 ∪ F1 deﬁned earlier, we abbreviate CspeF by Cspe. Given a possibly inﬁnite set of equations O on the
signature T(G) we deﬁne the ordered rewriting relation →O by s →O s′ iff there exists a position p in s, an
equation l = r in O and a substitution  such that s = s[p ← l], s′ = s[p ← r], and r < l.
It has been shown (see [22,19]) that by applying the unfailing completion procedure to a set of equations
H we can derive a (possibly inﬁnite) set of equations O, called o-completion of H and such that, ﬁrst, the
congruence relations =O and =H are equal on T(F); and second, the ordered rewrite relation →O is convergent
(i.e. terminating and conﬂuent) on T(F). By the termination of →O every ground term t admits at least one
normal form t′ which is by deﬁnition a term that cannot be rewritten.
From now on when we say “the rewrite system →O” this will mean “the ordered rewrite relation →O”, when
will say “by convergence of O”, we will mean “by convergence of →O on ground terms”. By convergence of O
we can deﬁne (t)↓O as the unique normal form of the ground term t for →O . If a term t is equal to its normal
form we say that t is normalised. Given a ground substitution  we denote by ()↓O the substitution with the
same support such that for all variables x ∈ Supp() we have x()↓O = (x)↓O . A substitution  is normal if
 = ()↓O . In the following, we will denote by R an o-completion of E = E1 ∪ E2.
4. Formal security analysis of protocols
4.1. Intruder systems
We ﬁrst recall here the general deﬁnition of intruder systems, as is given in [10,11]. In the context of a security
protocol (see e.g. [20,29] for a brief overview), we model messages as ground terms and intruder deduction rules
as rewrite rules on sets of messages representing its knowledge. The intruder derives new messages from a given
(ﬁnite) set ofmessages by applying intruder rules. Since we assume some equational axiomsH are satisﬁed by the
function symbols in the signature, all these derivations have to be considered modulo the equational congruence
=H generated by these axioms. An intruder deduction rule in our setting is speciﬁed by a term t in some signature
G. Given values for the variables of t the intruder is able to generate the corresponding instance of t. One may
intuitively think of a term t modulo H as a function. The variables of t are then its formal parameters.
Deﬁnition 1. An intruder system I is given by a triple 〈G,S ,H〉 where G is a signature, S ⊆ T(G,X ) and H is a
set of equations between terms in T(G,X ). To each t ∈ S we associate a deduction rule Lt : Var(t) → t and Lt,g
denotes the set of ground instances of the rule Lt modulo H:
Lt,g = {l → r | ∃, ground substitution on G, l = Var(t) and r =H t}
2 By deﬁnition < satisﬁes for all s, t, u ∈ T(G) (i) s < t[s] if s and t[s] are different terms and (ii) s < u implies t[s] < t[u].
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The set of rules LI is deﬁned as the union of the sets Lt,g for all t ∈ S .
Each rule l → r in LI deﬁnes an intruder deduction relation →l→r between ﬁnite sets of terms. Given two
ﬁnite sets of terms E and F we deﬁne E →l→r F if and only if l ⊆ E and F = E ∪ {r}. We denote →I the union
of the relations →l→r for all l → r in LI and by →∗I the transitive closure of →I .
Example 1. Let →I× be the relation between ground sets of terms deﬁned by the abelian group intruder
I× = 〈{×, i, 1}, {x × y , i(x), 1}, E×〉, where E× contains axioms (A), (C), (U), (I) from Subsection 2.2. One has:
a, b, c× a →I× a, b, c× a, i(a) →I× a, b, c× a, i(a), c
The latter deduction resulting from the application of the rule x, y → x × y with x instantiated by i(a), y
instantiated by c× a, with right-hand side c which is equal to i(a)× (c× a) modulo the equational theory.
Notice that by deﬁnition, given sets of terms E, E′, F and F ′ such that E =G E′ and F =G F ′ we have E →I F
iff E′ →I F ′. We simply denote by → the relation →I when there is no ambiguity about I .
The next result will allow us to restrict our study to deductions with terms in normal form.
Lemma 1. We assume that R is a rewrite system that is terminating and conﬂuent on ground terms such that =R
and =H are the same relations. Then given two sets of ground terms E and F , there is a deduction E → F iff there
is a deduction (E)↓ → (F)↓.
A derivationD of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of steps of the form E0 →I E0 ∪ {t1} = E1 →I · · · →I En with
ﬁnite sets of ground terms E0, . . . En, and ground terms t1, . . . , tn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A derivation is without stutter if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ei =H Ej implies i = j. The term tn is called the goal of
the derivation. We deﬁne E
I
to be the set of terms t such that there exists a derivation for intruder I starting
from E of goal t. If there is no ambiguity on the deduction system I we write E instead of EI .
From Lemma 1 one can easily prove that it sufﬁces to consider deductions on sets of terms in normal form.
In the sequel we will thus only consider derivations on sets of terms in normal form with rules yielding terms in
normal form.
4.2. Protocol analysis
In this section, we describe how protocols are modelled. The approach is standard [2,5,27]. Our semantics
follows the one in [18]. We only consider a single session of the protocol since it is well-known how to reduce
several sessions to this case.
In Dolev–Yao’s model the intruder can intercept, block and/or redirect all messages sent by honest agents.
He is also able to send messages by masquerading his identity. Honest agents may know his identity, wrongly
assume he is honest and communicate with him on that basis. He has complete control over the communication
medium. We model this by considering that the intruder is the network: messages sent by honest agents are
sent directly to the intruder and messages received by the honest agents are always sent by the intruder. From
the intruder’s point of view a ﬁnite execution of a protocol is therefore the interleaving of a ﬁnite sequence of
messages he has to send and a ﬁnite sequence of messages he receives (and adds to his knowledge set).
We also assume the interaction of the intruder with one agent to be an atomic step. The intruder sends
a message m to a honest agent, this agent tests the validity of this message and responds to it immediately.
Alternatively an agent may initiate an execution and in this case we assume it reacts to a dummy message sent
by the intruder.
A step is a triplet (recv(x); send(s); cond(e)) where x ∈ X , s ∈ T(G,X ) and e is a set of equations between
terms of T(G,X ). The meaning of a step is that upon receiving message x, the honest agent checks the equations
in e and sends the message s. An execution of a protocol is a ﬁnite sequence of steps.
Example 2. Consider the following simple protocol where two agents named A(lice) and B(ob) communicate
and where K is a symmetric key initially known by A only.
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A → B : exp(M ,B× K)
B → A : B
A → B : K
B → A : M
Alice sends some message M raised to the exponent B× K to Bob. Bob replies by sending back his name B.
In third message Alice reveals the key K to Bob. Then Bob computes the inverses i(K) and i(B) of K and B,
respectively, in the group of exponents. Next, he raises the ﬁrst message he received to the exponent i(K)× i(B).
He derives M that he can send in the last message.
Hence by assuming the algebraic properties of the exponentiation operator exp, and of the product and
inverse ×, i(·) in the group of exponents, we can model this protocol as:
recv(v1); send(exp(M ,B× K)); cond({v1 = cmin})
recv(v2); send(B); cond(∅)
recv(v3); send(K); cond({v3 = B})
recv(v4); send(exp(v2, i(B)× i(v4))); cond({v2 = exp(y ,B× v4)})
recv(v5); send(cmin); cond(v5 = M)
Note that in this setting we canmodel that at some step i themessage shouldmatch the pattern ti by adding an
equation vi
?= ti to S , as is done in last step of the above example. An agent may also verify previously received
messages when he get new information (for example when B receives the third message).
LetI=〈G, S ,H〉bean intruder system.A conﬁguration is a couple 〈P ,N 〉whereP is a ﬁnite sequenceof steps and
N is a set of ground terms (the knowledge of the intruder). From the conﬁguration 〈(recv(x); send(s); cond(e)) ·
P ,N 〉 a transition to (P ′,N ′) is possible iff there exists a ground substitution  such that x ∈ NI ,  |= e,
N ′ = N ∪ {s} and P ′ = P. A trace based-security is a property that holds for a protocol if it holds for individual
traces (runs of the protocol and intruder). Secrecy and many authentication properties can be reduced to the
following Reachability problem:
Reachability
Input: an initial conﬁguration 〈P ,N0〉.
Output: SAT iff there exists a reachable conﬁguration 〈∅,M 〉.
Protocol insecurity. A major security problem is to decide whether the intruder can deduce a secret m from
a ﬁnite sequence of message exchanges P . This problem can be reduced to reachability which in turn is reduced
to the resolution of some special constraint systems described below [18].
4.3. Constraint systems
We now introduce constraint systems that permit to model accurately the above reachability problems. We
ﬁrst extend the deﬁnition of uniﬁcation systems to equational theories:
Deﬁnition 2 (Uniﬁcation systems modulo). Let H be a set of equational axioms on T(G,X ). An H-Uniﬁcation
system S is a ﬁnite set of pairs of terms in T(G,X ) denoted by
{
ui
?= vi
}
i∈{1,...,n}. It is satisﬁed by a ground
substitution , and we note  |= S , if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ui =H vi.
We say that a uniﬁcation system is a word problem if it does not contain any variable.
Deﬁnition 3 (Constraint systems). Let I = 〈G, S ,H〉 be an intruder system. An I-Constraint system C is denoted:
((Ei  vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) and it is deﬁned by a sequence of couples (Ei , vi)i∈{1,...,n} with vi ∈ X and Ei ⊆ T(G,X ) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and Ei−1 ⊆ Ei for i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and by an H-uniﬁcation system S .
A ground substitution  satisﬁes a I-Constraint system C if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have vi ∈ Ei and if
 |=H S . We denote it by  |=I C.
Constraint systems are denoted by C and decorations thereof. Note that if a substitution  is a solution of a
constraint system C, by deﬁnition of constraint and uniﬁcation systems the substitution ()↓O is also a solution
of C. In the context of cryptographic protocols the inclusion Ei−1 ⊆ Ei means that the knowledge of an intruder
does not decrease as the protocol progresses.
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Example 3.Wemodel the protocol ofExample 2by the following constraint system.Firstwe gather all conditions
in a uniﬁcation system S
S =
{
v1
?= cmin, v2 ?= exp(y ,B× v4), v3 ?= B, v5 ?= M
}
The protocol execution for intruder I with initial knowledge {cmin} is then expressed by the constraint:
C = (( cmin  v1,
cmin, exp(M ,B× K)  v2,
cmin, exp(M ,B× K),B  v3,
cmin, exp(M ,B× K),B,K  v4,
cmin, exp(M ,B× K),B,K , exp(v2, i(B)× i(v4))  v5),
S)
We are not interested in general constraint systems but only in those related to protocols. In particular we
need to express that a message to be sent by a honest principal at some step i should be built from previously
received messages recorded in the variables vj , j < i, and from the initial knowledge. To this end we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 4 (Deterministic constraint systems). We say that an I constraint system ((Ei  vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) is deter-
ministic if for all i in {1, . . . , n} we have Var(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1}
The decision problems we are interested in are the satisﬁability and the ordered satisﬁability of intruder
constraint systems.
I Satisﬁability
Input: an I deterministic constraint system C.
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution  such that:  |=I C.
In order to be able to combine solutions of constraints for the intruder theory I1 with solutions of constraint
systems for intruders deﬁned on a disjoint signature we have, as for uniﬁcation, to introduce some ordering
constraints to be satisﬁed by the solution. Intuitively, these ordering constraints prevent from introducing a
cycle when building a global solution (ordering constraints can be arbitrary however we conjecture that some of
them can be eliminated by a sharper analysis of the problem). Thismotivates us to deﬁne the ordered satisﬁability
problem:
I Ordered satisﬁability
Input: an I deterministic constraint system C, X the set of all variables and C the set of all free constants
occurring in C and a linear ordering ≺ on X ∪ C .
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution  such that  |=I C and for all x ∈ X and c ∈ C , x ≺ c implies
c /∈ Sub(x).
We are also interesting in modelling the case of a passive intruder, i.e. an ordered satisﬁability problem in
which a putative solution  (a normal substitution) is given along with the constraint system. These can be
viewed, once  is applied, as special kind of constraint systems ((Ei  vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) where the Ei do not contain
any variable, and the uniﬁcation system S contains only equations of type:
• vi ?= ti , where ti a ground term;
• t ?= t′, where t′ and t′ are ground terms (word equations).
Moreover, we assume that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists exactly one equation vi ?= ti in S . We say that
constraint systems satisfying this requirements are ground.
I Deduction problem
Input: a ground I constraint system C.
Output: Sat iff all word equations are true and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have ti ∈ Ei .
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5. Modes and replacements
5.1. Modes
We have seen above how to reduce protocol security problems to solving constraints on terms modulo
equational theories. For this task we shall try to apply a modular approach and exploit the fact that equational
theories in this context are often combination of simpler ones. When one considers the union of two equational
theories over two disjoint signatures, a standard strategy for uniﬁcation or constraint solving is to replace
any subterm in the constraints, in a bottom-up fashion, by a new variable when the root of this subterm is
below a symbol from another signature. In that way we can reduce the problem to constraint solving in pure
subsignatures.
This decomposition technique cannot be applied as such in the case of non-disjoint signatures. We provide
here a notion of mode that allows one (under some hypotheses) to decompose a term in parts without losing
any deduction: the initial term can be rewritten by the equational theory iff one of its parts can be rewrit-
ten.
This notion of mode is different from the standard notion of type. The latter would impose that all consid-
ered terms must be well typed, while the former is utilised on ill-moded terms to split them into well-moded
parts.
For all f ∈ F ∪ X we deﬁne a function that gives the signature sig(f) to which a symbol f belongs (see
Fig. 1). As usual we extend the function sig to terms by setting, for a term t, sig(t) = sig(top(t)). In the following
we assume that there exists a mode function m(·, ·) such that m(f , i) is deﬁned for every symbol f ∈ F and every
integer i such that 1  i  ar(f).Moreoverwe impose that for allf , iwehavem(f , i) ∈ {0, 1}andm(f , i) ≤ sig(f).
A position p · i (where p is a position and i a strictly positive integer) in a term t is well-moded with respect
to m if and only if sig(t|p ·i) = m(top(t|p ), i). We do not mention m when it is clear from context. If a position of
t is not well-moded we say it is ill-moded in t. The root position of a term t is always ill-moded.
Let us now extend the well-moded notion:
• A term is well-moded if all its non-root positions are well-moded.
• An equation s = t is well-moded if s and t are well-moded and sig(s) = sig(t). An equational presentation
H = (G,A) is well-moded if all equations s = t in A are well-moded.
• A uniﬁcation problem s ?= t is well-moded if s and t are well-moded and sig(s) = sig(t). A uniﬁcation system{
si
?= ti
}
i∈J is well-moded if si and ti are well-moded and sig(si) = sig(ti) for all i ∈ J .• A substitution  is well-moded if for any variable x we have sig(x) = sig(x) and x is a well-moded term.
We now proceed to prove that if an equational theory is well-moded then its completion is also well-moded.
Since completion relies on syntactic uniﬁcation, the ﬁrst step is to prove that there is a most general uniﬁer of
two well-moded terms that is well-moded.
Lemma 2. Let t1, t2 be two well-moded terms with sig(t1) = sig(t2). If they are uniﬁable there exists a well-moded
most general uniﬁer  of t1, t2 such that t1 is well-moded.
Proof. Assume t1 and t2 are uniﬁable with a most general uniﬁer . We consider a derivation of  from equation
{t1 = t2} using a rule-based uniﬁcation algorithm (see e.g. [19]). We show by induction on the length of the
derivation that for all equations u = v in an intermediate system IS , we have sig(u)=sig(v) and u, v well-moded.
This is initially true by assumption.
Fig. 1. Deﬁnition of the sig(·) function.
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If we apply a decomposition rule to a well-moded equation f(. . . , u, . . .) = f(. . . , v, . . .) to get u = v, then
u = v is well-moded and sig(u) = sig(v) = m(f , i) for some i. If we apply a replacement of x = t in u = v, since
sig(x) = sig(t) and u = v is well-moded by induction hypothesis, the operation replaces occurrences of x by a
well-moded term with a top symbol in the same signature. The other cases are trivial. We ﬁnally notice that ,
considered as a set of equations, is well-moded, and thus, when replacing variables by their value, that t1 is
well-moded. 
Proposition 1. If H is a well-moded consistent equational presentation then there is a convergent rewrite system
O that deﬁnes the same equational congruence and such that O is well-moded (when its rules are considered as
equations).
Proof. We apply the unfailing completion procedure [19,22] to H to construct the convergent rewrite system
O. Let us prove by induction that all generated equations l = r are well-moded. This is true at the start of the
procedure by hypothesis onH. Let us now assume that at some point a set of well-moded equationsH’ has been
generated, and that there exists a critical pair between twowell-moded equations l = r and g = d . The procedure
uniﬁes a non-variable subterm l′ of l at a position p with the non-variable term g. Since l′ and g are non-variable,
their uniﬁability implies that top(l′) = top(g) and thus sig(l′) = sig(g). Since l is well-moded, the term l′ is also
well-moded. Thus the equation l′ = g is well-moded, and by Lemma 2 there exists a well-moded mgu  of l′ and
g such that for any variable x we have sig(x) = sig(x). Moreover, we have sig(l′) = sig(g) = sig(d) since H’ is
well-moded. Thus the equation r = l[p ← d] added to H’ is well-moded. By induction, all equations of the
obtained equation system O are well-moded. 
We call a subterm value of a term t a syntactic subterm of t that is either t itself, an atom in t, or occurs at an
ill-moded position in t. We denote Sub(t) the set of subterm values of t. By extension, for a set of terms E, the
set Sub(E) is deﬁned as the union of the subterm values of the elements of E. The subset of the maximal and
strict subterm values of a term t plays an important role in the sequel. We call these subterm values the factors
of t, and denote this set Factors(t). By deﬁnition this set is empty if t is itself an atom.
Example 4. Consider two binary symbols f and g with sig(f) = sig(g) = 1 and:
{
m(f , 1) = m(g, 1) = 1
m(f , 2) = m(g, 2) = 0
Consider the term t = f(f(g(a, b), f(c, c)), d). Its subterm values are a, b, f(c, c), c, d , and its factors are a, b,
f(c, c) and d .
In the rest of this paper and unless otherwise indicated, the notion of subterm will refer to subterm values.
From now on we assume that E is a well-moded equational presentation, and thus that R is a well-moded rewrite
system.Under this assumption, one can prove that rewriting never overlaps subtermvalues (see Lemma4below).
We will use in the sequel a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of subterms, which is that if s ∈ Sub(t) \ {t} then
either s is an atom or occurs at an ill-moded position in t.
The following lemma is a simple property of consistent equational theories:
Lemma 3. If H is a consistent equational theory then for any equation l = r in a presentation of H if there exists
a substitution  such that l > r then l is not a variable.
Proof.By contradiction assume that l is a variable and that there exists a ground substitution  such that l > r.
By the subterm property of simpliﬁcation orderings we have l /∈ Var(r). Let 1 and 2 be two substitutions of
support Var(r) ∪ {l} and equal to  on Var(r) and such that l1 and l2 are two different free constants. We have
l1 =H r1 = r = r2 =H l2. This contradicts the fact that H is consistent. 
Lemma 4. Assume that R is a set of well-moded equations, that l = r ∈ R, and that s →R s′ with s = s[q ← l],
s′ = s[q ← r], and l > r. If p is ill-moded in s and q  p then there exists a position q′ in l such that a variable
occurs at position q′ in l and q · q′  p .
Proof. Since l is well-moded p cannot be equal to q · j with j position of a function symbol in t. Hence p refers
to a position in the substitution . 
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Lemma 4 states that ill-moded positions do not occur in the dark zone since this part is well-moded.
l
τ
s
5.2. Normalisation and replacement
5.2.1. Subterms and normalisation
We now study the evolution of the subterms of a term t when t is being normalised. By considering the
application of an equation in R with minimal right-hand side and assuming the theory is well-moded, we can
prove that (ordered) rewriting by R preserves factors in normal form. Since R is convergent, this allows us to
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let t be a ground term with all its factors in normal form. If t′ is minimal for < among the terms u such
that t →R u then
• either sig(t) = sig(t′) and Factors(t′) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe or
• sig(t) /= sig(t′) and t′ ∈ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe.
Proof. Assume t →R t′ with t′ minimal among the terms u such that t →R u. Let l → r ∈ R be the rule applied
on t at position p with substitution  in order to obtain t′. Since the factors are in normal form the position p is
above or incomparable to any position of a factor of t and thus all positions p ′ above p (including p) are either
 or well-moded.
Let q be a position of a factor s of t. By Lemma 4 either q is incomparable with p , and thus s is also a factor of
t′ at position q, or there exists a variable x at a position p ′ in l such that p · p ′ ≤ q. Since q is a minimal ill-moded
position in t, we have that s is either equal to or a factor of x.
By minimality of t′ and by monotonicity of < we can assume that variables of r are either variables of l or
instantiated by the constant cmin. Since Var(r) ⊆ Var(l) ∪ {cmin} and since r is well-moded, we have:
• r is a factor of t and r is a variable,
• or Factors(r) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe.
Only two cases are possible:
1. p /=  or r is not a variable: If p /=  we have top(t) = top(t′), and thus sig(t) = sig(t′). Otherwise if p = 
then r is not a variable by assumption. Since by Lemma 3 l is not a variable either and since the equational
theory is well-moded, one has sig(l) = sig(r) and thus sig(t) = sig(t′). In both cases one has Factors(t′) ⊆
Factors(t) ∪ Cspe and sig(t′) = sig(t).
2.p =  and r is a variable of l: Notice ﬁrst that since p = we have t′ = r. Since the equational theory is well-
moded we have sig(r) = sig(l). Let f be a symbol ofF such that r occurs as a ith argument of f in l. Since l is
well-moded we have m(f , i) = sig(r) = sig(l). Since p =  we have top(t) = top(l) and thus m(f , i) = sig(t).
There are two sub-cases:
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· If r is at a position of a factor of t, then r is ill-moded at this position, i.e. sig(r) /= m(f , i), and therefore
sig(r) /= sig(t) and we indeed have t′ ∈ Factors(t) and sig(t′) /= sig(t).
· Otherwise r is well-moded, and since sig(r) = sig(l) this implies that sig(r) = sig(l) and thus sig(t′) =
sig(t). One then easily sees that Factors(t′) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe. 
Lemma 6. Let t be a term with all its factors in normal form. Then either
• (t)↓ ∈ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe and sig((t)↓) /= sig(t).
• Or sig((t)↓) = sig(t).
In both cases one has Sub((t)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t))↓ ∪ Cspe.
Proof. It sufﬁces to apply Lemma 5 along a derivation normalising t such that at each step a minimal successor
(with respect to <) for the relation →R is chosen. 
Lemma 7. For any normalised substitution , for any term m and for any s ∈ Sub((m)↓) one of the following
holds:
• s ∈ Cspe.
• There is u ∈ Sub(m) such that (u)↓ = s and sig(u) = sig(s).
• There exists x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(x).
Proof. Let m and s be two terms and let  be a ground substitution such that s ∈ Sub((m)↓). We have:
Sub((m)↓) ⊆ (Sub(m))↓ ∪ Sub(Var(m)) ∪ Cspe
Assume there exists no x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(x) and s /∈ Cspe. Let u ∈ Sub(m) be minimal for the
subterm relation such that (u)↓ = s. The above inclusion and s /∈ Sub(Var(m)) ∪ Cspe imply u is well-moded.
If it is a constant we have necessarily u = s and sig(u) = sig(s). Assume now u is neither a constant or a variable
and thus Factors(u) is not empty.
Byminimality of uwe have s /∈ ((Sub(u) \ {u}))↓. Thus for all v in Sub(u) \ {u} the above inclusion (replacing
m by v) imply s /∈ Sub((v)↓). Consider now a bottom-up normalisation of u stopping at factors of u and let t
be the obtained term. By Lemma 6 and s ∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(t) we have sig(t) = sig(s). By deﬁnition of t we have
sig(t) = sig(u). Therefore there exists u ∈ Sub(m) such that (u)↓ = s and sig(u) = sig(s). 
5.2.2. Replacement and normalisation
We now give conditions under which the replacement of a normal subterm s of a term t commutes with the
normalisation of t. We denote u,v the replacement of u by v such that if u appears at positions u as a subterm
(i.e. as a subterm value) of t then tu,v = t[u ← v]. We denote in short u the replacement u,cmin .
We deﬁne the notion of free terms. A ground term s is free in a set of terms T with respect to a ground
substitution  if there is no t ∈ T such that (t)↓ = (s)↓. A term which is not free is said to be bound by  in T .
We will omit  or T when they are clear from context. Since rewriting by R never overlaps subterm values, we
can prove that normalisation and subterm replacement commute.
Lemma 8. Let t be a ground term with all its factors in normal form, and let s be a ground term in normal form
with s /= (t)↓ and s /∈ Cspe. Then we have (ts)↓ = ((t)↓s)↓.
Proof. We consider a sequence of application of rules of R that normalises t such that, at each step a minimal
successor for the relation →R is chosen. Consider the sequence t1 = t, . . . , tn = (t)↓ of the intermediate terms.
For 1 ≤ i < n the term ti is not in normal, and thus is in Factors(ti−1) ∪ Cspe. Thus by Lemma 5 and for 2 ≤ i < n
we have sig(ti) = sig(ti−1) and Factors(ti) ⊆ Factors(ti−1) ∪ Cspe. By iteration one thus obtains that for i < n
one has sig(ti) = sig(t) and Factors(ti) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe, and therefore the factors of ti are in normal form
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus the rule li → ri ∈ R applied on ti is applied above (and without interfering with) the
factors by Lemma 4. On the other hand the replacement is applied below (or at the level of) the factors of ti .
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Therefore the sequence t1 →R · · · →R tn implies the equalities t1s =E · · · =E tns, and thus by transitivity of
the equality, ts =E (t)↓s. We conclude by convergence of R. 
Example 5. Consider the equational theory E = {f(g(x)) = x}. We have:
– by deﬁnition of the mode function :
{
sig(f) ≥ m(f , 1)
sig(g) ≥ m(g, 1)
– since f(g(x)) is wellmoded :
{
m(f , 1) = sig(g)
m(g, 1) = sig(x)
– since the theory is wellmoded : sig(f) = sig(x)
This implies that, depending on the signature to which f belongs, we have either
sig(f) = sig(g) = sig(x) = m(g, 1) = m(f , 1) = 0
or
sig(f) = sig(g) = sig(x) = m(g, 1) = m(f , 1) = 1
Since there is no critical pairs and the right-hand side is a subterm of the left-hand side, the rewrite system
obtained by unfailing completion is f(g(x)) → x. Consider now the terms t = f(g(a)) and s = g(a). In both
choices of the mode function, the subterms of t are t and a, and thus ts = t. This shows how the notion of mode
permits to deﬁne replacements compatible with normalisation.
Let s be a normalised ground term and let  be a ground normal substitution. Next lemma shows that under
the provision that a normalised term s is free in Sub(t) for a ground substitution , the replacement of s in
(t)↓ yields the same result as the replacement of s in . This will permit to transfer a pumping argument on
instantiated terms to a pumping argument on substitutions. The proof again relies on the convergence of R.
Lemma 9. Let t be a term,  be a normalised substitution and s be a ground term in normal form. Assume s is free
in Sub(t) for  and let ′ = (s)↓. We have:
((t)↓s)↓ = (t′)↓
Proof. Since R is ground convergent it is sufﬁcient to prove:
(t)↓s =R t′
For all variables x we have x′ =R x(s) by deﬁnition of ′, and thus:
t′ =R t(s)
Since s is free and normalised, there is no subterm r of t, even with r variable, such that (r)↓ = s, and thus such
that r = s. Therefore we have, by deﬁnition of s as a replacement on subterm values:
t(s) =R (t)s
Moreover, we have (t)↓ =R t. Since  is normalisedwe have Sub((t)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t))↓ ∪ Sub() and Sub(t) ⊆
Sub(t) ∪ Sub(). Since s is free and normalised it is neither in Sub(t) nor in (Sub(t))↓. Thus we have:
((t)↓)s =R (t)s
Hence we have (t)↓s =R t′ which completes the proof. 
Example 6. Consider now the equational theory E = {f(x, x) = 0}, the term t = f(f(x, x), f(x, g(cmin))) and the
substitution  such that x = g(a), and consider the replacement a. Using the notations of Lemma 9, we
have x′ = g(cmin), and thus t′ = f(f(g(cmin), g(cmin)), f(g(cmin), g(cmin))), while on the other hand (t)↓a =
f(0, f(g(cmin), g(cmin))). This example shows that even though s is in normal form, an extra normalisation is
needed after replacement. Replacing one of the occurrence of x by g(a) also shows why we need s to be free in
Lemma 9.
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6. Well-moded intruder systems
From now on we will consider intruder systems over the signature F0 ∪ F1 modulo the equational theory
E = E0 ∪ E1 as deﬁned in Section 3.1. Let I1 = 〈F ,S , E〉 be an intruder system where terms in S are well-moded.
Such an intruder system is called a well-moded intruder. The nice structure of well-moded intruder will allow
one to design an algorithm for intruder constraint solving, under some hypotheses.
We can show that there is at most one alternation of signature on all well-moded terms:
Lemma 10. Every well-moded term t can be written t = t′ where t′ is a pure 1-term (possibly a variable) and  a
substitution that maps all variables in its support to pure 0-terms.
Proof. Since t is well-moded, below an occurrence of a F0 symbol, we can ﬁnd only F0 symbols. 
In the case of a well-moded intruder it is possible to split S into two sets of well-moded terms S0 and
S1 such that for all terms t in Si we have sig(t) = i for i ∈ {0, 1} and such that S0 contains terms built from
symbols ofF0. This permits to extract from I1 a simpler intruder, namely I0 = 〈F0,S0, E0〉. In the sequel, we will
reduce some decision problems on I1 to decision problems on I0 under some adequate hypotheses. We deﬁne
E →S0 F (respectively, E →S1 F , respectively, E →S F ) if E →l→r F with l → r ∈ Lt,g for t ∈ S0 (respectively,
S1, respectively, S).
Properties of deduction rules. Under the assumption that S is well-moded, one can prove the following key
lemmas. Lemma 12 states that when a term appears as a new subterm of a knowledge set, it has just been built
by the intruder. Considering a derivation, this will permit to apply Lemma 14 iteratively in order to show that
this term may be eliminated from the derivation. This is the main step of the proof that terms not appearing as
instance subterms of the initial constraint systems can be replaced by smaller terms (with respect to the ordering
< on ground terms) in a solution to yield a smaller solution.
Lemma 11. Assume that E, F and s are in normal form and E → Lu,gF using rule u ∈ S with substitution , and such
that s /∈ (F ∪ Cspe) \ E. If for all x ∈ Var(u) such that x = s we have sig(x) /= sig(s) then (Es)↓ → Lu,g(Fs)↓.
Proof. First let us assume that the rule is not a stutter (i.e. is such that F /= E), and thus (u)↓ /∈ E. Then, let
us notice that if u has no variables, the left-hand side of the deduction rule is empty, and thus the same rule
can be applied on (Es)↓. Since u is a pure term its atoms are constants in Cspe. Thus s /∈ (F ∪ Cspe) \ E implies
s /∈ Sub((u)↓), and thus (Fs)↓ = (Es)↓ ∪ {u}. The lemma is thus valid in this speciﬁc case. Let us now review
the general case.
By deﬁnition of S the term u is well-moded. The restriction on x permits to ensure that all occurrences of r
as a subterm in Var(u) are ill-moded in u. The restriction s /∈ (F ∪ Cspe) \ E and the fact that the transition
is not a stutter imply (u)↓ /= s. Since E is in normal form and u is well-moded the factors of u are in normal
form and we can apply Lemma 9, which yields the desired result. 
Lemma 12. Assume E and F are in normal form. If E → IF and t ∈ Sub(F) \ (Sub(E) ∪ Cspe), then F \ E = t and
E →Lu,g F , with u ∈ S and sig(u) = sig(t).
Proof. The hypotheses permit to apply Lemma 6. If the rule is applied with substitution  this implies
Sub((u)↓) ⊆ {(u)↓} ∪ Sub(E) ∪ Cspe. Thus t /∈ Sub(E) ∪ Cspe implies t = (u)↓ and t /∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(u).
Thus by Lemma 6 sig(t) = sig(u) = sig(u). 
Lemma 13. Let D : E0 → · · · → En be a derivation such that there exists s ∈ Sub(Ei) \ (Sub(E0) ∪ Cspe). Then
there exists in D a step Ej−1 →ls→s Ej with j ≤ i and ls → s ∈ Lu,g with sig(u) = sig(s).
Proof. Consider the minimal index j such that s ∈ Sub(Ej). By hypothesis we have j > 0 and j ≤ i. Moreover
by minimality of j we have Sub(Ej) /= Sub(Ej−1). Since s /∈ Cspe Lemma 12 implies that Ej = Ej−1, s, and that if
Ej−1 →ls→s Ej with ls → s ∈ Lu,g then sig(u) = sig(s). 
Lemma 14. Assume E, s and t are in normal form, s /∈ (E ∪ Cspe), s /= t and cmin ∈ E. Then E, s → E, s, t implies
(Es)↓, s → ((E, t)s)↓, s.
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Proof. Assume E, s →Lu,g t and let  be the normal substitution such that Var(u) ⊆ E, s and (u)↓ = t. We have
(ts)↓ = ((u)↓s)↓ by deﬁnition of t. Since E (and thus ) is in normal form the factors of u are in normal
form. Thus by Lemma 8 we have ((u)s)↓ = (ts)↓.
The replacement s is applied at all occurrences of s as a subterm of u. Since u is well-moded and u /= s,
this implies that all replacements occur at or below the level of variables of u. Given x ∈ Var(u) two cases may
occur:
• If sig(x) = sig(x) the replacement is applied on all occurrences of s as subterm of the factors of x.
• If sig(x) /= sig(x) the replacement is applied on all occurrences of s as a subterm of x.
From this we can construct a substitution ′ such that:
• x′ = s if x = s and sig(x) = sig(x).
• x′ = ((x)s)↓ otherwise.
This substitution yields a rule in Lu,g that, applied on (Es)↓, s, permits to deduce (ts)↓ by construction. 
6.1. Hypotheses on intruder systems
6.1.1. Locality hypothesis on intruder systems
The previous lemmawill be used in conjunctionwith an extra hypothesis that is related to the locality property
[21]. Notice that this assumption is satisﬁed if the theory E1 is deﬁned on F1 and S1 only contains pure 1-terms.
Hypothesis 1: If E →S1 E, r →S1 E, r, t and r /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe then there is a set of terms F such that
E →∗S0 F →S1 F , t.
Under this hypothesis when a subterm can be derived with several successive applications of rules in S1 it
can be obtained with a unique application too. This allows one to bound the number of S1 rule applications in
a derivation with respect to the number of subterms in the constraint system we attempt to solve.
Let us deﬁne the closure of S1 as the smallest set 〈S1〉 of terms that contains S1 and such that if s, s′ ∈ S1 and
x is a variable of s of mode 1 then s[x ← s′] ∈ 〈S1〉. By construction the set 〈S1〉 contains only terms with head
in F1 and thus contains only well-moded terms.
Note that in Hypothesis 1 the condition r /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe implies that r /∈ Sub(E) and thus is of signature 1.
Its ill-moded occurrences in the second rule application can be replaced by cmin, and its well-moded occurrences
can be replaced by composing a new deduction rule in the closure 〈S1〉. Thus we can prove that for any set of
terms S1 the set of terms 〈S1〉 satisﬁes Hypothesis 1, the drawback of this construction being that 〈S1〉 may be
inﬁnite.
6.1.2. Unique matching property
We consider now a unique matching property. That is, given an arbitrary ground term t, we require that the
matching of t by a term s in S1 either fails (has no solution) or has a unique solution if the variables of signature
1 of s are already instantiated by ground terms.
Hypothesis 2: For all terms s ∈ S1, for all substitutions  such that (X1 ∩ Var(s)) ⊆ T(F) and for all
ground terms t there is at most one ground substitution  such that s =H t, and this substitution can
be computed.
In other words, a matching equation t ?= s (with the above notations) determines a partial mapping from the
set of ground substitutions of support X1 ∩ Var(s) to the set of ground substitutions of support X0 ∩ Var(s).
Notice that Hypothesis 2 is satisﬁed when the presentation H is a union of two presentations on disjoint
signatures as in [10,11]: in this case one can choose a mode function such that the mode of the jth argument of
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an operator in Fi is always i. With this choice the hypothesis is always true since all variables of a term s ∈ S1
are instantiated by the substitution .
6.1.3. Reducibility of E to E0
Let us deﬁne what we mean by reduction of an equational theory to another one.
Deﬁnition 5 (Reduction algorithm). A computable function A(_) is a reduction algorithm from an equational
theory (F , E) to an equational theory (F ′, E ′) iff for any general uniﬁcation system S modulo E , the result A(S)
is a ﬁnite list of couples ((Ai , Si))1≤i≤n such that:
Sol(S) =
n⋃
i=1
Ai(Sol(Si))
where the Si are general uniﬁcation systems modulo E ′, the Ai are mappings from the set of substitutions to
itself, and Sol(S ′) denotes the set of solutions of system S ′.
When only satisﬁability of uniﬁcation systems modulo E is considered, we will also call reduction algorithm
a non-deterministic procedure that guesses one of the Si . An example of reduction algorithm is basic narrowing
for the equational theory ({e, d}, {d(e(x, y), y) = x}). For solving a general uniﬁcation problem in this theory we
can apply the basic narrowing procedure which is a combination of rewriting and instantiation (see e.g. [34]).
The Si are the systems derived by the basic narrowing procedure. We can solve these systems in the theory
({e, d},∅) and we get Sol(Si), for each i. The algorithmAi applies the substitution that has been computed in the
narrowing process to each element of Sol(Si) in order to compute an element of Sol(S).
Moreover any solution of the initial problem S can be obtained that way.
Hypothesis 3: The equational theory (F , E) is reducible to (F0, E0).
Note that in the special case where E1 does not depend on symbols inF0 we can take forA(_) a decomposition
procedure similar to the one employed for uniﬁability in disjoint theories in [34,3].
A much more interesting example of reduction is given by the ﬁnite variant property from [13]. The reduction
deﬁnition that we give here is similar to Comon–Lundh and Delaune’s one, but is slightly more general since we
neither specify how the reduction is to be done (by narrowing in their deﬁnition) nor impose conditions on E0
(which is required to be ﬁnitary in [13]). It turns out that, quite surprisingly, there is an example of an intruder
system [7] which is reduced to an intruder equipped with the AU equational theory and for which ordered
satisﬁability of deterministic constraint systems is decidable. We believe that covering the associativity of the
concatenation operator, an important property in practice, is an advantage of our approach.3
7. Minimal solutions of constraint systems
We show now that whenever a constraint system is satisﬁable it admits a solution whose subterms can be
obtained by instantiating subterms of the given constraint system. Thanks to Hypothesis 1 this will give a bound
on the number of S1 rule applications.
Let  be a normal ground substitution and C be a constraint system. We say that  is bound in C if for
every s ∈ Sub(Var(C)) the term s is bound by  in Sub(C). The goal of this section is to prove that whenever a
constraint system C is satisﬁable, there exists a normal ground substitution  bound in C such that  |= C. The
last key ingredient to this proof is the notion of quasi well-formed derivations.
Deﬁnition 6. A derivation E0 →∗ En and of goal t is quasi well-formed if for every term u ∈ Sub(En) we have
sig(u) = 1 implies u ∈ Sub(E0, t) ∪ Cspe.
3 In this case, the Ai is a function built incrementally during the narrowing process, when one collects the uniﬁers applied so far.
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Our goal in the rest of this section will be to prove that for all E and t either t /∈ E or there exists a quasi
well-formed derivation starting from E of goal t if I satisﬁes Hypothesis 1, and to give some properties of these
derivations. Let us from now on assume this is the case for the well-moded intruder system I .
Lemma 15. Assume cmin ∈ E and E is in normal form. If t ∈ E there exists a quasi well-formed derivation starting
from E of goal t.
Proof. Given a derivation D : E →∗ F starting from E of goal t we deﬁne D ={
s ∈ Sub(F) | sig(s) = 1 and s /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe
}
.
By contradiction assume there exists a term t and a set of terms E, both in normal form, such that
min({|D| |D starts from E of goal t}) > 0
Among the derivations starting from E of goal t let D be a derivation such that |D| is minimal among the
derivations starting from E of goal t. Let D : E = E0 → E1 → · · · → En = F and s ∈ D. Let us contradict the
minimality of D.
Claim 1. There exists an index is < n such that s = Eis \ Eis−1 and s /∈ Sub(Eis−1) and Eis−1 →Lu,g Eis with u ∈ S1.
Proof of the claim. Let is be minimal among the indices i such that s ∈ Sub(Ei). The claim is an application
of Lemma 12 on this transition. 
We now assume s is of maximal index, i.e. that no term tj of signature 1 produced by rule in S1 with j > is is
in D. Moreover, for j > is one can apply Lemma 14 to construct a derivation D′:
E0 →∗ Eis → (Eis+1s)↓, s → · · · → (Ens)↓, s
Iterating the replacement of s by cmin if necessary, we assume that s /∈ Sub((Ejs)↓) for j ∈ {0, . . . , n}. If we
extend < as a total order on sets of terms, one easily see (see proof of Proposition 4, for example) that this
iteration terminates, thus yielding sets of terms that do not contain s.
Note that s /∈ Sub(t) implies that this derivation is also of goal t. Let us prove that we can construct a
derivation also of goal t that does not contain s in the left-hand side of any rule.
Consider the rule l → r ∈ Lu,g applied from s to (Ejs)↓, s with a substitution  (that is l = Var(u) and
r = (u)↓). We assume wlog that this rule is not a stutter. Assume s ∈ l. If for all variables x instantiated by s we
have sig(x) /= sig(s), we can replace s by cmin in u, and therefore in l and r by Lemma 8. Since s /∈ Sub(r) we
have a transition from (Ej−1s)↓, s to (Ejs)↓, s with the rule l, cmin \ s → r in Lu,g in which s does not appear
on the left-hand side.
If there exists a variable x ∈ Var(u) such that sig(x) = sig(s) and x = s, then sig(s) = 1 implies that sig(x) = 1
and, since u is well-moded, sig(u) = 1, and therefore u ∈ S1. Since j − 1 ≥ is this implies we have the sequence:
(Ej−1s)↓ →S1 (Ej−1s)↓, s →S1 (Ej−1s)↓, s, t
with s /∈ Sub((Ej−1s)↓, t). Thus we can apply Hypothesis 1, which yields a derivation:
(Ej−1s)↓ →∗S0 F →S1 F , t
Lemma 12 implies that all terms of signature 1 in Sub(F) are also in Sub((Ej−1s)↓).
By iterating along the transitions in the derivation D′ we obtain a new derivation D′′ in which s is on the left-
hand side of no transition and that does not contain more subterms of signature 1. By removing the transition
creating s in D′′ we thus obtain a derivation starting from E of goal t that contradicts the minimality of D. Thus
there exists quasi well-formed derivations starting from E of goal t. 
First let us prove an auxiliary lemma that will be used to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 16. Let D : E0 →∗ En be a derivation without stutter, and let ti = Ei \ Ei−1. Assume that, for index j we
have Ej−1 →Luj ,g Ej, and sig(uj) = 1, and sig(tj) = 0, and tj /∈ Cspe. Then tj ∈ Sub(E0).
Proof. Let i be the minimal index such that tj ∈ Sub(Ei). We have i ≤ j. By contradiction assume i > 0. Then
by Lemma 13 and t ∈ Sub(Ei) \ Sub(Ei−1) we have Ei−1 →Lui ,g Ei with Ei = Ei−1, t and sig(u) = sig(t) = 0. The
latter implies i /= j, and therefore that the derivation contains a stutter. 
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Lemma 16 permits to bound the number of applications of a rule in S1 in a quasi well-formed derivation.
Proposition 2. If t ∈ E there exists a derivation D starting from E of goal t such that the number of rules in S1
applied in D is bounded by |Sub(E, t)|.
Proof. Since t ∈ E we can consider by Lemma 15 there exists a quasi well-formed derivation D starting from E
of goal t. W.l.o.g. we assume that D is without stutter. Let t1, . . . , tn be the terms deduced by a rule in S1 in D.
Since the derivation is without stutter n is the number of applications of rules in S1 in D. Let n0 be the number
of ti of signature 0, and n1 be the number of ti of signature 1. Since D is quasi well-formed and by Lemma 16 we
have:{
n0 ≤ |{t ∈ Sub(E) | sig(t) = 0}|
n1 ≤ |{t ∈ Sub(E, t) | sig(t) = 1}| 
Actually, not only we can bound the number of applications of rules in S1 (Proposition 2), know that the
result is a subterm of E, t for a quasi well-formed derivation starting from E of goal t, but under the same
conditions we can also bound the possible values for subterms of variables of signature 1 in a rule of S1.
Proposition 3. Let D : E0 →Lu1,g · · · →Lun ,g En be a quasi well-formed derivation without stutter, let i be an index
such that sig(ui) = 1 and let x ∈ Var(ui) be a variable with sig(x) = 1. Then we can choose the substitution i with
which the rule is applied such that xi ∈ Sub(E0, t).
Proof. Assume the substitution with which the ith rule is applied is . Let ti = (u)↓ and s = x.
If sig(s) = 0 then sig(s) /= sig(x), u is well-moded and therefore s ∈ Factors(u). Assume ﬁrst that s ∈ Sub(ti).
Then by Lemma 16 and D quasi well-formed we have s ∈ Sub(E0, t). Assume now that s ∈ Sub(ti). Hence s /= ti ,
and by Lemma 9:
(u((s)↓))↓ = ((u)s)↓ = (((u))↓s)↓
Choosing i = (s)↓, we also have ti = (uii)↓, and in that case xi ∈ Sub(E0).
If sig(x) = 1, we have x ∈ Sub(E0, t) since the derivation D is quasi well-formed. 
7.1. Stability of derivations by replacement
Lemma 17will be applied in Lemma 19with s a free term. It shows that given some conditions on s, derivations
are stable when replacing s by cmin.
Lemma 17. Let E and F be ﬁnite sets of normalised terms with cmin ∈ E. Let s, t be two normalised terms not in
Cspe with s ∈ E \ Sub(E), and t ∈ E ∪ F . We have:
(ts)↓ ∈ ((E ∪ F)s)↓
Proof. We note that s ∈ E \ Sub(E) implies (Es)↓ = E and thus s ∈ (Es)↓. By considering a derivation starting
from E ∪ F of goal t and building s, we see that t ∈ E, F implies, by iteration of Lemma 14, that (ts)↓ ∈
((E, F)s)↓, s. Since (Es)↓ = E and s ∈ E, this implies s ∈ ((E, F)s)↓ and thus (ts)↓ ∈ ((E, F)s)↓. 
7.2. Existence and properties of bound solutions
In the rest of this section, we consider a constraint system C = ((Ei  vi)1≤i≤n,S) and a normal ground
substitution  that satisﬁes C. We now prove that there exists a bound substitution that also satisﬁes C. First we
prove it is possible to replace one free term s of signature in Sub() by the minimal constant cmin.
Lemma 18. Let s /∈ Cspe be a term such that s ∈ Sub((Ek)↓) for some 1  k  n. Then either there exists i < k
such that s ∈ Sub(vi) or there exists m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that (m)↓ = s and in that case either sig(s) = sig(m) or
m is a constant.
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Proof. Since the constraint system is deterministic we have:
Sub((Ek)↓) ⊆ (Sub(Ek))↓ ∪ Sub(v1, . . . , vk−1) ∪ Cspe
Assume that there is no i < k such that s ∈ Sub(vi). Then s /∈ Cspe implies there exists m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that
(m)↓ = s. By s /∈ Cspe and Lemma 7 there exists u ∈ Sub(m) such that (u)↓ = s and sig(u) = sig(s). 
Lemma 19. If there exists x ∈ Var(C) and s ∈ Sub(x) such that s is free in Sub(C) for  then (s)↓ |= C.
Proof. Let ′ = (s)↓. Note that s free implies s /∈ Cspe.
First let us prove that ′ |= S . Since s is free in Sub(C) Lemma 9 implies that for all equations s ?= t in S we
have (s)↓ = (t)↓ implies (s′)↓ = (t′)↓.
Let us now prove that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} if there is a derivation starting from (Ei)↓ of goal vi then there
is a derivation starting from (Ei′)↓ of goal vi′. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and consider the set:
s = {i | s ∈ Sub((Ei)↓, vi)}
If j /∈ s we have (Ej)↓s = (Ej)↓ and vj = vjs. Since s is free Lemma 9 implies (Ej′)↓ = (Ej)↓ and
vj
′ = vj. Thus by assumption there exists a derivation starting from (Ej′)↓ of goal vj′.
Thus if  = ∅ the lemma is valid. Otherwise  /= ∅ and we can consider the minimum index i0 in . By
minimality of i0 and by Lemma 18 we have s /∈ Sub((Ei0)↓) and thus s ∈ Sub(vi0). By Lemma 12 this implies
s ∈ (Ei0)↓.
For j ∈  let Fj = (Ej)↓\(Ei0)↓. By (Ej)↓ = (Ei0)↓ ∪ Fj and s ∈ (Ei0)↓\Sub((Ei0)↓) we can apply
Lemma 17 to obtain a derivation D′j starting from ((Ej)↓s)↓ of goal vj′. Since s is free Lemma 9 implies D′j
is a derivation starting from (Ej′)↓ of goal vj′.
Thus for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a derivation starting from (Ei′)↓ of goal vi′. 
The proof of next Proposition 4 is a direct consequence of Lemma 19 and exploits the well-foundedness of
the order < to prove it is possible to iteratively replace all free subterms.
We can now prove that a satisﬁable constraint system is satisﬁed by a bound solution.
Proposition 4. Let C be a satisﬁable constraint system. There exists a normal bound substitution  such that  |= C.
Proof. Consider the set  of normal substitutions that satisfy C. By hypothesis  is not empty. Let  be a
minimal substitution in  for the total ordering < on ground terms extended to substitutions by considering
their co-domains as ﬁnite multisets of ground terms. Let us prove  is bound to C.
By contradiction assume there exists s free in Sub() and let ′ = s. By monotony of< we have ′ < . By
deﬁnition of R we have (′)↓ ≤ ′. By Lemma 19 we also have (′)↓ |= C. Thus (′)↓ ∈  and (′)↓ <  which
contradicts the minimality of . 
In next lemma we prove that instantiating the constraint C by a bound substitution does not introduce any
new subterm.
Lemma 20. Let  be a substitution bound by itself in Sub(C). We have:
Sub((Sub(C))↓) = (Sub(C))↓
Proof. Let S = (Sub(C))↓. The inclusion S ⊆ Sub(S) is trivial. The inclusion Sub(S) ⊆ S follows directly from:
Sub((Sub(C))↓) ⊆ (Sub(C))↓ ∪ Sub(Var(C)) ∪ Cspe
Since  is bound we have Sub(Var(C)) ⊆ (Sub(C))↓ and by hypothesis we have Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). 
8. Sufﬁcient conditions for decidability
We now give sufﬁcient conditions for the decidability of the various decision problems. Given a well-moded
intruder I we ﬁrst treat the case of the I deduction problem in Section 8.1. Then we give sufﬁcient conditions
for the decidability of the I ordered satisﬁability of deterministic constraint systems.
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8.1. Deduction problem
First we turn to deduction problems. Let ((Ei  vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) be a ground constraint system for a well-moded
intruderI = 〈F ,S , E〉. Let alsoS1 = {t ∈ S | sig(t) = 1}. Theorem1gives a sufﬁcient condition for thedecidability
of the I deduction problem.
Theorem 1. If:
(1) S1 is ﬁnite;
(2) 〈F0,S0, E0〉 has a decidable deduction problem;
(3) Word problems are decidable for E;
(4) Hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisﬁed.
Then the I deduction problem is decidable.
Notice that since ground constraint systems are also deterministic, other sufﬁcient conditions will be given
in Section 8.2. Our motivation for the introduction of deduction problems was that, contrary to the case of the
union of disjoint signatures, this amounts to the reduction of ground problems to deterministic problems, which
are likely to be more difﬁcult to solve.
Given the third condition, it is clear that it sufﬁces to prove that ground reachability problems are decidable.
Given a set of terms E and a term t, both ground, our algorithm decides non-deterministically t ∈ E. It consists
in:
(1) Guessing the number n—bounded by |Sub(E, t)| by Proposition 2—of rules in S1 applied in a quasi well-
formed derivation—it is sufﬁcient to consider this case by Hypothesis 1 and Lemma 15—starting from E
and of goal t.
(2) Then guessing for each of these rules:
– the term u ∈ S1 actually employed, which is possible since S1 is ﬁnite,
– the result r of the rule (in Sub(E, t) by Lemma 16 and the deﬁnition of quasi well-formed derivations),
– for each variable x of u with sig(x) = 1, the instance of x in Sub(E, t) by Proposition 3.
Let u′ be the term u with all its variables of signature 1 instantiated by ground terms.
(3) For each rule u, let  be result of the matching of t by u′ (abort if there is no solution). Notice that  is
ground and computable by Hypothesis 2.
(4) From the above computations, if ti is the ith term built by a S1 rule and i is the associated ground
substitution, form the ground reachability problems:∧
x∈Var(u)sig(x)=0
E ∪ {t1, . . . , ti−1} S0 xi
(5) Purify (which is possible because word equations are decidable) and solve with respect to intruder I0 the
obtained reachability problems.
As a side remark, we believe that this algorithm can be transformed into a polynomial one if the ground
reachability problems and if the matching problems can be solved in polynomial time. The procedure would
compute a subset S (with t ∈ S) of terms reachable from E by checking one-step deduction between a set of terms
and a term. One-step deduction test would be performed either by (pre-computed) rules of the form i → ti
(with ti ∈ Sub(E, t)) or tests of E′ S0 s for s subterm of the i .
8.2. Ordered satisﬁability problem
We now state the main theorem of this article, which concerns the reduction of I ordered satisﬁability
problems to I0 ordered satisﬁability problems.
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Theorem 2. We consider a well-moded intruder system 〈F ,S , E〉 such that S1 is ﬁnite, the intruder subsystem
〈F0,S0, E0〉 has a decidable ordered constraint satisﬁability problem and Hypotheses 1 and 3 are satisﬁed. Then the
ordered constraint satisﬁability problem for 〈F ,S , E〉 is decidable.
Before giving a decision procedure for I intruder systems under the conditions of Theorem 2, we introduce
the notions of past-bound terms and of complete preﬁx which permit to reduce to deterministic constraint
systems.
8.2.1. Past-bound terms and complete preﬁxes
Let C = ((Ei  vi)1≤i≤n,S) be a constraint system and  be a solution of C. Given t ∈ Sub(C) let us deﬁne
It =
{
j | (t)↓ ∈ Sub((Sub(Ej))↓, vj)
}
. If It /= ∅ we say that the term t is deduction-bound. In this case we deﬁne
the index of t, and denote it , the minimum index in It . If t ∈ Sub(C) is deduction bound, we say it is past-bound
if t ∈ Sub((Sub(Ejt ))↓) and past-free otherwise. Finally, given a past-bound term t of index it , we say that a
term m is a complete preﬁx of t if:
(1) sig(m) = sig((t)↓) and (m)↓ = (t)↓.
(2) For all factor u of m; either (u)↓ is past-free or sig(u) = sig((u)↓).
(3) Var(m) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vit}.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to compute complete preﬁxes
for all past-free and constant terms t do
ϕp(t) = t
end for
while there exists deduction bound t ∈ Sub(C) with ϕp(t) undeﬁned do
Let t ∈ Sub(C) with ϕp(t) undeﬁned
if ϕp(·)is deﬁned on all factors of m then
For all t′ such that (t)↓ = (t′)↓, deﬁne ϕp(t′) as the term t where all factors u have been replaced by ϕp(u)
end if
end while
Lemma 21. It is possible to compute a complete preﬁx of (t)↓ for all past-bound terms t in Sub(C).
Proof. Let Ti ⊆ Sub(C) be the set of past-bound terms t of index i for which Algorithm 1 does not compute a
complete preﬁx. By contradiction assume ∪ni=1Ti /= ∅. Let i be minimal such that Ti /= ∅, and let t be minimal
in Ti for the subterm relation. By deﬁnition of the algorithm we assume t is not a constant, and thus t /∈ Cspe.
Since t is of index i we have t /∈ Sub({v1, . . . , vi−1}). Thus, by Lemma 7 there exists m ∈ Sub(t) such that m is a
preﬁx of (t)↓. By deﬁnition of Ti , we have t ∈ Ti and (m)↓ = (t)↓ imply that m ∈ Ti . Thus, by minimality of
t for the subterm relation in Ti , we have t = m and thus t is a preﬁx of (t)↓. Since t is neither a variable nor a
constant, the factors of t are deﬁned. By minimality of t in Ti , for every past-bound factor u of t, ϕp(u) is deﬁned
and is a complete preﬁx of (u)↓. One easily checks that ϕp(t) is then a complete preﬁx of t, thus contradicting
t ∈ Ti , and therefore ∪ni=1Ti = ∅. 
Notice that Algorithm 1 only relies on the knowledge of the equivalence classes on terms in Sub(C) induced
by the solution  and on the signature of terms. Both can be guessed in linear time with respect to the size of
the input constraint problem.
Lemma 22. Assume t ∈ E, and there exists a derivation from E to t such that all rules but the last one are S0 rules.
Let u ∈ S1 be the term employed for the last deduction, and  be the substitution applied. Then Var(u) ⊆ ES0 .
Proof. This follows directly from the hypotheses. 
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Lemma 23. Let  be a solution of a constraint system C = ((Ei  vi)1≤i≤n,S), and t be a deduction-bound term such
that sig(t) = 0 and t is of index i. Then if there exists a quasi well-formed derivation without stutter from (Ei)↓
of goal (v)↓ containing a deduction E →S1 E, t then t is past-bound.
Proof. Lemma 12 and the fact that the derivation is without stutter imply that t ∈ Sub((Ei)↓) and thus t ∈
Sub((Sub(Ei))↓). We conclude that t is past-bound from the fact that t is of index i. 
8.2.2. Algorithm
We present here a decision procedure for a well-moded intruder I that takes as input a constraint system
C = ((Ei  vi)1≤i≤n,S) and a linear ordering<i on variables and constants of C. Letm = |Sub(C)| be the number
of subterms in C.
Algorithm 2 Combination algorithm
Step 1: Choose a m′  m and a sequence (ui)1im′ of terms in S1, and for each ui introduce |Var(ui)| new variables
yi1, . . . , y
i|Var(ui)|. Let 
i (i ∈ {0, 1}) be the subset of these variables of signature i.
Step 2: Choose an equivalence relation ≡ among subterms of C ∪ 
1. Let Q = {q1, . . . , qn} be a set of new variables each
denoting an equivalence class. Add to S the equation t ?= q for each t ∈ q for each equivalence class q ∈ Q. Let S ′
be the obtained constraint system.
Step 3: Choose a subterm relation on Q ∪ 
0 and a function sig : x ∈ Q ∪ 
0 → sig(q).
Step 4: Guess a subset Q1 of Q, and let L = {l1, . . . , lk } be the set Q1 ∪ {v1, . . . , vn} totally ordered by <d such that i < j
implies vi <q vj and form the constraint system C′ = ((Fi  li)1ik ,S ′′) with
⎧⎨
⎩
F1 = E1
Fi+1 = Fi ∪ (Ej+1\Ej) If li = vj
Fi+1 = Fi , li Otherwise
Step 5: Replace each past-bound term in C’ with a complete preﬁx and past-free terms with the representative q of their
equivalence class, and let C′′ be the obtained constraint system.
Step 6: Guess a subset of m′ constraints Fi  li in C′′. Replace the jth of these constraints by |Var(uj)| constraints Fj  yjk
for k ∈ {1, . . . , |Var(uj)|} and add an equation lj ?= uj to S ′′;
Step 7: Reduce S ′′ to a system of general uniﬁcation modulo E0.
Step 8: Solve the resulting I0 deterministic intruder system with the linear constant restriction <i .
8.2.3. Comments on the algorithm
We assume in the following that the ordered satisﬁability problem (C,<i), with C = ((Ei  vi)1in,S), is
satisﬁed by a bound substitution . Let m = |Sub(C)| be the number of subterms in C.
Step 1: By Proposition 2 For each of the derivation starting from (Ei)↓ of goal (vi)↓ there is at most m
applications of a rule in S1. Actually, as we will merge the derivations of the intruder, there will be
overall at most m′ applications of a rule in S1. Since S1 is ﬁnite, the term ui employed in the ith of these
rules can be guessed.
Step 2: The equivalence relation can be guessed since  is bounded. Proposition 3 permits to extend this
equivalence relation over 
1.
Step 3: The choice of a subterm relation and of signature is needed to know whether a deduction-bound term
is past-free or past-bound and to compute a complete preﬁx of it.
Step 4: Q1 is the set of terms that are deduced by a rule of S1 that does not end a derivation starting from (Ei)↓
of goal (vi)↓. The construction of C′ consists in merging the derivation once the set Q1 has been
guessed. The ordering<d is the order of deduction. Notice that this construction leads to stutters since a
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variable vi is also in an equivalence class. This is however more convenient for describing succinctly
the construction.
Step 5: The choices made permit to compute a complete preﬁx of each past-bound term. Replacing a term by its
complete preﬁx is preserves the satisfaction by . The obtained system C′′ will be deterministic once
puriﬁed by Lemma 23.
Step 6: The replacement corresponds to the checking that the guessed rule uj permits to construct lj . The
instance of the variables of uj can be deduced using only rules in S0 by Lemma 22.
Step 7: The reduction can be done thanks to Hypothesis 3.
Step 8: The resolution is decidable by hypothesis on I0.
From these comments, one easily sees that the algorithm is complete. It can also easily be checked that it is
correct.
8.3. Exponentiation
We present now an application of well-moded theories in the case of the exponentiation operator which is
used e.g. with Difﬁe–Hellman scheme for the collaborative construction of a secret key by two principals.
In order to support properties of the exponential operator in cryptographic protocols analysis our goal is
to prove the decidability of ordered satisﬁability for an intruder able to exploit the properties of exponenti-
ations. Notice that the speciﬁcation of the exponentiation operation is dependent on the speciﬁcation of the
multiplication, and thus Theorem 1 of [10] cannot be applied directly.
Notice also that simple extensions of the theory we consider here would lead to undecidability of intruder
constraints even when they are reduced to equational uniﬁcation problems. See [28] for a survey of several expo-
nentiation theories and their uniﬁcation problems. The axiomatisation we consider here was to our knowledge
ﬁrst introduced in [30].
8.3.1. Intruder deduction system
We consider the union F of the two signatures F0 = {_ × _, i(_), 1} and F1 = {exp(_, _)}. We consider terms
in T(F ,X ) modulo the following equational theory Eexp,×:
x × (y × z) = (x × y)× z (A)
x × y = y × x (C)
x × 1 = x (U)
x × i(x) = 1 (I)
exp(x, 1) = x (E0)
exp(exp(x, y), z) = exp(x, y × z) (E1)
Let T = {x × y , i(x), 1, exp(x, y)}. We now consider the intruder system Iexp =
〈F , T , Eexp,×〉 that represents the
modular exponentiation operation as employed for Difﬁe–Hellman-like construction of secret keys.
8.3.1.1. Modes. One easily checks that for the following mode and signature functions the theory Eexp,× is a
well-moded theory:
• m(×, 1) = m(×, 2) = m(i, 1) = 0;
• m(exp, 1) = 1 and m(exp, 2) = 0;
• sig(×) = sig(i) = sig(1) = 0;
• sig(exp) = 1.
According to this deﬁnition of mode and signature we deﬁne Eexp,× to be the union of E0 = {(A), (C), (U), (I)}
and E1 = {(E0), (E1)}. The set E0 generates the theory of a free abelian group whose generators are the atomic
symbols in C. Meadows and Narendran have proved [30] that general uniﬁcation modulo Eexp,× can be reduced
to general uniﬁcation modulo E0.
Eexp,× is reducible to E0, and thus Hypothesis 3 is satisﬁed.
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8.3.1.2. Intruder Iag. According to mode and signature functions, we can deﬁne a sub-intruder system by
taking S0 = {x × y , i(x), 1}. Let Iag be the intruder 〈{×, i, 1}, {x × y , i(x), 1}, E0〉. Taking S1 = S \ S0, it is also clear
that S1 is ﬁnite.
• S1 is ﬁnite.
• The Iag ordered constraint satisﬁability problem is decidable in [11].
Lemma 24. Let E be a ﬁnite set of terms in normal form, and let r, t be two terms in normal form such that:
E →S1 E, r →S1 E, r, t
If r /∈ Sub(E, t) and E → E, t then there exists a term u such that:
E →S0 E, u →S1 E, u, t
Proof. Assume r /∈ Sub(t) and E → E, t. Since r /∈ Sub(E) it is necessary an exponential by Lemma 12. Let  be
the substitution with which the ﬁrst rule x1, y1 → exp(x1, y1) is applied, and  be the substitution with which the
second rule x2, y2 → exp(x2, y2) is applied. Since E → E, t one must have r = x2 or r = y2, and r /∈ Sub(E)
implies that r /∈ Sub(x1, y1). Let us ﬁrst assume that x2 = r. In this case we have a derivation:
D1 : x1, y1, y2 →S0 x1, y1, y2, y1 × y2→S1 x1, y1, y2, y1 × y2, (exp(x1, y1 × y2))↓ = t
Thus, if y2 /= r, we have y2 ∈ E and therefore a derivation as requested. If y2 = r, by Lemma 11 and applying
r we also have a deduction:
x1, y1, cmin, y1 × cmin →S1
x1, y1, cmin, y1 × cmin, (exp(x1, y1 × cmin))↓ = (tr)↓
Since r /∈ Sub(t), this implies that if x2 = r, there exists a sequence E →S0 E, r′ →S1 E, r′, t. On the other
hand, if x2 /= r, then x2 ∈ E, and we can directly apply Lemma 11 to ﬁnd a deduction with only one rule in S1
such that y2 /= r. 
Iexp satisﬁes Hypothesis 1.
It is ﬁnally shown in [30,13] that one can deﬁne a normal form for the equational theory Eexp,× such that the
ﬁrst argument of an exponential operator is never itself an exponential operator. Given two ground terms t1 and
t2 in normal form, and a variable x, it is then easy to prove (by case analysis on the top operators of t1 and t2
that the equation exp(t1, x)
?= t2 has at most one ground solution .
Iexp satisﬁes Hypothesis 2.
Gathering all the results given above, and applying Theorems 1 and 2, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The Iexp deduction problem and the Iexp ordered satisﬁability problem are decidable.
Notice that the former is a consequence of the latter. Actually, the reduction result for the deduction problem
is mostly useful in the case where the ordered satisﬁability problem for the underlying I0 intruder system is not
decidable, or its decidability is not known, but its deduction problem is. It can be applied e.g. when reducing
an intruder system to an AC intruder system (〈{×}, {x × y}, {(A), (C)}〉), for which the deduction problem is
decidable, but the status of its ordered satisﬁability problem is open.
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8.3.1.3. Complexity. First let us examine the case of the deduction problem. Since satisﬁability of linear equa-
tions over ZZ can be evaluated in polynomial time, the deduction problem for Iag is in PTIME. The algorithm
depicted above for solving the generated matching problems is also in PTIME. Thus we conjecture that the
deduction problem for the Iexp intruder is in PTIME.
Second, and given that uniﬁcation modulo Eexp,× is NP-complete [30], that the ordered satisﬁability problem
for the Iag intruder is in NPTIME, that our reduction algorithm works in NPTIME, we also conjecture that
ordered satisﬁability problems for the Iexp intruder system is NP-complete.
9. Conclusion
We have introduced a combination scheme for intruder theories that extends disjoint combination. We have
shown how it can be used to derive new decidability results for security protocols. The scheme relies on an
extension of the notion of locality. Unfortunately it does not apply to homomorphism properties (handled in a
speciﬁc way in [24]) because they are ill-moded by nature and more investigations are needed to see whether it
can be extended in this direction.
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